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Abstract I exploit parallel considerations in the philosophy of mind and
metaethics to argue that the reasoning employed in an important argument for
panpsychism overgeneralizes to support an analogous position in metaethics:
panmoralism. Next, I raise a number of problems for panmoralism and thereby
build a case for taking the metaethical parallel to be a reductio ad absurdum of
the argument for panpsychism. Finally, I contrast panmoralism with a position
recently defended by Einar Duenger Bohn and argue that the two suffer from
similar problems. I conclude by drawing some general lessons for panpsychism.
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1 Introduction
Human beings and other complex systems undergo a variety of experiences,
from unpleasant feelings of pain to vibrant experiences of color. While that is
the starting point to any realist theory of consciousness, panpsychism takes
that starting point a step further by holding that the entities characterized by
fundamental physics that compose those systems are themselves conscious. As
a result, if there is a fundamental level of reality, then panpsychism implies
that consciousness is a rock-bottom phenomenon.1
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1 I assume that there is a fundamental level of reality, but my arguments can be restated so
that they are consistent with the falsity of this assumption. Cosmopsychists maintain that
a cosmic subject is fundamental (e.g., Goff, 2017). I won’t consider cosmopsychism here;
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In this paper, I exploit parallel considerations in the philosophy of mind
and metaethics to argue that the reasoning employed in an important ar-
gument for panpsychism overgeneralizes to support an analogous position in
metaethics: panmoralism. To the extent that panmoralism should be rejected,
so also should the argument for panpsychism; so unless there is something
else to recommend the view, panpsychism should be rejected as well. This is
the moral parody argument against panpsychism. While this argument does
not refute panpsychism, it does pose an indirect challenge to the view. When
confronted with the moral parody argument, panpsychists are left with four
options: (i) adopt panmoralism; (ii) reject moral realism; (iii) explain how
the relevant parallels can be broken; or (iv) replace the argument for panpsy-
chism with some other argument. While options (i) and (ii) add to the costs
of panpsychism, options (iii) and (iv) suggest that there is more work to be
done in establishing panpsychism as a respectable theory of mind.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I provide an introduction
to the positions in the philosophy of mind and metaethics that will figure
into my arguments. In Section 3, I lay out the argument for panpsychism.
In Section 4, I argue that the same sorts of considerations that apparently
motivate panpsychism (as a version of phenomenal realism) also apparently
motivate panmoralism (as a version of moral realism). In Section 5, I build
a case for taking the metaethical parallel to be a reductio ad absurdum of
the argument for panpsychism. In Section 6, I contrast panmoralism with a
position recently defended by Bohn (2018) and argue that the two suffer from
similar problems. Finally, in Section 7, I conclude by drawing some general
lessons for panpsychism.
2 Background
In this section, I provide an overview of moral realism, panpsychism, and some
related positions that will figure into my arguments. Following the lead of Goff
(2017) and Rosen (2018), I deploy an ideology of (metaphysical) ground and
essence in order to make these positions precise. I start by providing a brief
introduction to these notions.
Suppose that there is a party in the conference room. We might then ask
why there is a party in the conference room. In asking this question, we needn’t
be requesting a causal explanation of the party’s occurrence; perhaps we al-
ready know that the party was caused by the department chair’s sending an
email. Rather, in our more philosophical moods, we think of reality as strat-
ified into levels, some more fundamental than others. We want to know what
underlies the existence of the party at a given time, and we expect an answer
to cite the facts in virtue of which there is a party in the conference room.
I use “panpsychism” as shorthand for what Goff (2017) would call “constitutive smallist
panpsychism.”
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Ground is this notion of determination and constitutive explanation that links
the less fundamental to the more fundamental.2
In addition to asking why a given entity exists, we might ask what it is to
be that entity. An answer to this question should state what is essential to
the entity in question.3 This is not the same as stating what must be true if
the entity is to exist (Fine, 1994). It is necessary that if Socrates exists, then
Socrates is a member of {Socrates}. But being a member of {Socrates} is no
part of what it is to be Socrates. The dependency runs in the other direction:
it lies in the essence of {Socrates} to contain Socrates as its sole member. The
notions of ground and essence are closely related. For whenever some facts
ground another, it is highly plausible that the ground-theoretic connection is
explainable with reference to the essence of one or more constituents of the
grounded fact. As Fine (2012) puts it, “It is the fact to be grounded that
‘points’ to its grounds and not the grounds that point to what they may
ground” (p. 76). Why does the existence of Socrates ground the existence of
{Socrates}? Because it lies in the essence of a set that if its members exist,
then the existence of those members grounds the existence of the set of those
members. Why does the fact that snow is white ground the fact that either
snow is white or the moon is made of cheese? Because it lies in the essence of
disjunction that disjunctions are grounded in their true disjuncts. It is easy to
multiply examples (Greenberg, 2014, p. 173).
With the notions of ground and essence in our toolkit, I now turn to
the aforementioned positions. Let’s call the moral and normative properties
that we pre-theoretically countenance “o-moral” and “o-normative” proper-
ties, respectively (“o” for “ordinary”).4 We can then understand an o-moral
or o-normative fact to be a fact about the instantiation of an o-moral or o-
normative property. Moral realism, as I understand it, is the minimal thesis
that there are obtaining o-moral facts. Understood in this minimal way, moral
realism is prima facie compatible with various views concerning the metaphys-
2 Following Rosen (2010), I take grounding to be a multigrade relation between facts,
understood to be “structured entities built up from worldly items—objects, relations, con-
nectives, quantifiers, etc.—in roughly the sense in which sentences are built up from words”
(p. 114). I use “ [P ]” as a function term for the fact that P, which obtains just in case P.
When [P1], [P2], . . . ∈ ∆, I write “∆ < [Q ]” for “[P1], [P2], . . . ground [Q ].” The primary
notion of ground is full : if ∆ < [Q ], then nothing needs to be added to ∆ in order to explain
the obtaining of [Q ]; and it is metaphysically necessary that if every fact in ∆ obtains, then
[Q ] obtains. But we can define a notion of partial ground (≺) in terms of full ground: [P ]
≺ [Q ] just in case [P ] fully grounds [Q ] on its own or in combination with other facts. The
partial grounding relation is a strict partial order.
3 I take the notion of essence to be canonically expressed by the operator “it lies in the
essence of x that.” As Fine (1995, p. 69, n. 2) points out, we needn’t take a subexpression of
the form “the essence of x ” to be a singular term that refers to a special sort of entity, just
as we needn’t take the subexpression “not” to be a significant grammatical component of
the operator “it is not the case that.” See Lowe (2008, pp. 38–40) and Lowe (2012, pp. 941,
946–47) for reasons to deny that the essence of a thing is some further entity. The notion of
essence is closely related to a notion of real definition (Rosen, 2015).
4 This terminology is inspired by Goff (2017), who distinguishes “o-phenomenal” proper-
ties from the hypothetical phenomenal properties posited by panpsychists (“u-phenomenal”
properties in my terminology).
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ical grounds for o-moral and o-normative facts. In particular, it is prima facie
compatible with both naturalism and robust realism.
In order to distinguish these positions, let’s understand a natural property
to be a property that is either non-normative or definable in wholly non-
normative terms. Following Rosen (2018), I understand naturalism to be the
view that every obtaining o-moral and o-normative fact is fully metaphysically
grounded in natural facts. Since in the paradigm cases, ground-theoretic con-
nections are explainable with reference to the essences of the grounded items,
it is highly plausible that if naturalism is true, then it lies in the essences of
o-moral and o-normative properties that their instantiations be fully meta-
physically grounded in natural facts (if those facts obtain).
Robust realism, by contrast, is the view that some facts about o-moral or
o-normative properties are metaphysically ungrounded. In particular, if the in-
stantiation of every o-moral property is fully metaphysically grounded in more
fundamental facts, then some of those facts are metaphysically ungrounded
facts about o-moral or o-normative properties. Perhaps the instantiation of
every o-moral property is fully metaphysically grounded in fundamental facts
about normative reasons (as a “reasons-firster” might hold) (Berker, 2019, p.
931). Or perhaps the instantiation of every o-moral property is fully metaphys-
ically grounded in natural facts together with some fundamental normative
or moral laws (Rosen, 2017a,b, 2018). Or perhaps the instantiation of every
o-moral property is fully normatively (but not metaphysically) grounded in
natural facts, where normative and metaphysical grounding are distinct rela-
tions.5 Regardless, if robust realism is true, at least some facts about o-moral
or o-normative properties have no full metaphysical explanation.
In the philosophy of mind, phenomenal realism is the view that there are
experiences such that there is something that it is like to undergo them. Let’s
call the experiences that we pre-theoretically countenance “o-experiences.” O-
experiences instantiate o-phenomenal properties, which type them in terms of
what it is like for individuals to undergo them. An o-phenomenal fact is a fact
about the instantiation of an o-phenomenal property by an o-experience. As I
understand it, phenomenal realism is prima facie compatible with both phys-
icalism and property dualism about o-experience (“physicalism” and “dualism”
for short).
In order to distinguish these positions, let’s understand a microphysical
property to be a fundamental property expressed by a predicate of a com-
pleted physics and a microphysical object to be a fundamental (and funda-
mentally non-mental, non-experiential, non-normative) object denoted by a
5 Fine (2012) argues that in addition to a metaphysical grounding relation, we should also
recognize a normative grounding relation that is of special interest to ethics and a natural
grounding relation that is of special interest to science (see also Bader, 2017). Fine maintains
that these relations differ in modal strength: if the facts in ∆ normatively ground [Q ], then it
is normatively necessary that if the facts in ∆ obtain, then [Q ] obtains; whereas if the facts
in ∆ naturally ground [Q ], then it is naturally necessary that if the facts in ∆ obtain, then
[Q ] obtains. Fine (2002/2005) argues that neither of these two forms of necessity is reducible
to the other or to metaphysical necessity. On this basis, he maintains that obtaining moral
facts are normatively necessary but metaphysically contingent (see also Rosen, 2020).
The Moral Parody Argument Against Panpsychism 5
term of that physics.6 We can then understand a microphysical fact to be a
fact about the instantiation of a microphysical property by one or more micro-
physical objects. Physicalism is the view that every obtaining o-phenomenal
fact is fully metaphysically grounded in microphysical facts.7 Again, since in
the paradigm cases, ground-theoretic connections are explainable with refer-
ence to the essences of the grounded items, it is highly plausible that if phys-
icalism is true, then it lies in the essences of o-phenomenal properties that
their instantiations be fully metaphysically grounded in microphysical facts (if
those facts obtain).
Dualism, by contrast, is the view that some facts about o-phenomenal
properties are metaphysically ungrounded. In particular, if the instantiation
of every o-phenomenal property is fully metaphysically grounded in more
fundamental facts, then some of those facts are metaphysically ungrounded
facts about o-phenomenal properties. Perhaps the instantiation of every o-
phenomenal property is fully metaphysically grounded in microphysical facts
together with some fundamental psychophysical laws. Or perhaps the instan-
tiation of every o-phenomenal property is fully naturally (but not metaphysi-
cally) grounded in microphysical facts (see n. 5 above). Either way, if dualism
is true, at least some facts about o-experience have no full metaphysical ex-
planation.
Panpsychists maintain that there is more to fundamental reality than
what physics can describe. Like dualists, they deny that every obtaining o-
phenomenal fact is fully metaphysically grounded in microphysical facts. But
contrary to dualists, they maintain that every obtaining fact about o-experience
is (partially) metaphysically grounded in facts about phenomenal properties
that we do not pre-theoretically countenance and of whose natures we are at
present largely ignorant (Chalmers, 2015/2017, pp. 252–53).8 These theoretical
phenomenal properties are hypothesized to be fundamental properties of the
fundamental objects (or “ultimates”) designated by the terms of a completed
physics.9 Thus, if electrons are fundamental objects countenanced by a com-
pleted physics, then panpsychists maintain that electrons are phenomenally
conscious. Let’s call the experiences that the ultimates supposedly undergo
“u-experiences” (“u” for “ultimate”). U-experiences instantiate u-phenomenal
properties, which type those experiences in terms of what it is like for the ul-
timates to undergo them. We can then understand a u-phenomenal fact to be
a fact about the instantiation of a u-phenomenal property by a u-experience.
6 This definition of a microphysical object expands upon Wilson’s (2006) “no fundamental
mentality” constraint (see also Goff, 2017, ch. 2.1.6). I use the phrase “completed physics”
as a placeholder for whichever account of physical theory is best suited to formulating
physicalism.
7 For ease of discussion, I am setting aside the question of whether physicalism is best
formulated to allow for o-phenomenal facts that have a fundamental totality fact as a partial
ground (Blaesi, 2021). None of my arguments turn on how we answer this question.
8 On one interpretation, emergentist panpsychists deny the grounding claim (Goff, 2017,
p. 19). Recall that I am using “panpsychism” as shorthand for “constitutive smallist panpsy-
chism” (see n. 1 above).
9 I have adapted the term “ultimate” from Strawson (2006/2008).
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Since panpsychists maintain that the ultimates are fundamentally experi-
ential, they must deny that they are “microphysical objects” in the previously
defined sense. In order to distinguish panpsychism from physicalism, then,
let’s understand a u-physical fact to be a fact about the instantiation of a
microphysical property by one or more ultimates (regardless of whether those
ultimates are fundamentally mental, experiential, or normative). According to
panpsychists, every obtaining fact about o-experience is fully metaphysically
grounded in u-phenomenal facts (on their own or together with u-physical
facts). Mother Nature starts out with a handful of basic phenomenal colors,
so to speak. She brushes one color here, another color there, using ultimates
colored by experience to paint a complex scene, until voilà—the experience of
pain emerges! If only we knew more about the paint—the “intrinsic nature”
of fundamental reality—there would be no “explanatory gap” between the u-
level facts and the facts about pain. That’s how I’ll understand panpsychism
throughout. It’s certainly an interesting view of the world. But why would
anyone be a panpsychist?
3 The master argument for panpsychism
Let’s say that an o-phenomenal fact [P ] arises from some microphysical facts
∆ just in case the facts in ∆ either naturally ground [P ] or metaphysically
ground [P ] (on their own or together with the holding of a psychophysical
law). Understood in this way, the claim that o-phenomenal facts arise from
microphysical facts is neutral between physicalism and dualism but incompat-
ible with panpsychism.10 Panpsychism derives much of its appeal from the
following argument:
(1) Either o-phenomenal facts arise from microphysical facts, or o-phenom-
enal facts are fully metaphysically grounded in u-phenomenal facts (on
their own or together with u-physical facts).
(2) If o-phenomenal facts arise from microphysical facts, then either phys-
icalism or dualism is true.
10 More carefully, while the claim is compatible with the versions of dualism I considered in
Section 2 above, it is incompatible with versions of dualism according to which o-phenomenal
facts are neither partially metaphysically nor naturally grounded in any microphysical facts.
One of these holds that the instantiation of every o-phenomenal property is merely natu-
rally necessitated by microphysical facts. If there are fundamental psychophysical laws, we
might say that the obtaining of an o-phenomenal fact [P ] is naturally necessitated by the
conjunction of the microphysical facts in ∆ just in case it is metaphysically necessary that
if the facts in ∆ obtain and the psychophysical laws hold, then [P ] obtains. If, contrary to
Chalmers (1996), the psychophysical laws hold of metaphysical necessity, then the obtaining
of [P ] is naturally necessitated by the conjunction of the facts in ∆ just in case the obtaining
of [P ] is metaphysically necessitated by the conjunction of the facts in ∆. Another version
of dualism holds that the o-phenomenal facts stand in neither an explanatory nor a nomic
relation to the microphysical facts but merely happen to be correlated with them in the
actual world. These versions of dualism strike me as implausible, so I have set them aside
throughout. However, my stipulative definition of “arises from” can be easily modified to
accommodate these versions of dualism. Similar remarks apply to robust realism in Section
4 below. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me to clarify my terminology.
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(3) Physicalism is false: it completely leaves out experience.
(4) Dualism is also false: it requires brute emergence.
(5) So, o-phenomenal facts are fully metaphysically grounded in u-phenom-
enal facts (on their own or together with u-physical facts).
Call this the “master argument for panpsychism.” In one form or another,
it is to be found in Nagel (1979/2012) and Strawson (2006/2008). It is also
connected to Goff’s (2017) case for panpsychism. Since it is valid, the crucial
question is why each of its premises should be accepted. Once we set aside the
competitors to physicalism, dualism, and panpsychism, premises (1) and (2)
should be relatively uncontroversial. The argument turns largely on premises
(3) and (4).
Let’s start with (3). Nagel (1979/2012) and Strawson (2006/2008) seem to
think that it is obvious.11 In their defense, there are a number of arguments
that have been offered against physicalism. Drawing from Yetter-Chappell and
Chappell (2013), who also explore the relationship between arguments in the
philosophy of mind and metaethics, I’ll focus on two. The first is inspired
by Moore’s (1903/1993) open question argument.12 Let “phenomenal redness”
denote the o-phenomenal property that types experiences of red in terms of
what it is like to undergo them, let “e” denote a particular experience of red,
and let “r-fiber firing” denote the neural correlate of phenomenal redness with
respect to e. The first step of the argument establishes a semantic conclusion:
(6) The statement “e instantiates r-fiber firing, but it doesn’t instantiate
phenomenal redness” isn’t self-contradictory.
(7) If (6), then “phenomenal redness” doesn’t mean the same thing as “r-
fiber firing.”
(8) Therefore, “phenomenal redness” doesn’t mean the same thing as “r-
fiber firing.”
The second step of the argument uses (8) to support the ontological conclu-
sion that phenomenal redness is distinct from r-fiber firing. For given (8), the
statement “phenomenal redness = r-fiber firing” is not analytically true. But
true identity statements are either analytic or synthetic. Therefore, the state-
ment “phenomenal redness = r-fiber firing” must be synthetically true (if true
at all).
Some physicalists have embraced this conclusion and suggested that psy-
chophysical identity statements can be modeled after synthetic identity state-
ments familiar from the sciences, such as “water = H2O.” However, it seems
that “phenomenal redness = r-fiber firing” is unlike these familiar synthetic
identity statements. In such cases, one term flanking the identity predicate
11 More precisely, Strawson (2006/2008) seems to think that reductive physicalism is obvi-
ously false; he independently argues that a version of non-reductive physicalism is committed
to “brute emergence” (see n. 17 below).
12 See also Broad’s (1925) objection to a view he calls “behaviourism”: “However completely
the behaviour of an external body answers to the behaviouristic tests for intelligence, it
always remains a perfectly sensible question to ask: ‘Has it really got a mind, or is it merely
an automaton?’ ” (p. 614).
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rigidly designates whatever plays a certain role and the other rigidly desig-
nates something that happens to play that role. For example, “water” rigidly
designates the stuff around here that plays the watery role (i.e., has the prop-
erty of being a colorless, odorless liquid that falls from the sky, fills the lakes,
etc.), while “H2O” rigidly designates H2O, which, as it happens, plays the
watery role. This seems to make it possible to a priori deduce that water =
H2O from the microphysical facts. By contrast, “phenomenal redness” (or the
concept that it expresses) picks out its referent in terms of how it feels, which
isn’t simply a role that its referent happens to play; how it feels to instanti-
ate phenomenal redness is essential to phenomenal redness.13 This makes it
hard to see how the putative identity between phenomenal redness and r-fiber
firing could be a priori deduced from the microphysical facts. After all, we
can’t simply check to see whether the causal role contingently associated with
phenomenal redness is played by some physicalistically acceptable property,
because that will always leave open whether the property in question feels like
and thus is phenomenal redness.
This asymmetry suggests that psychophysical identity statements cannot
be modeled after synthetic identity statements familiar from the sciences.
Moreover, some philosophers have argued that all of the synthetic identities
with which we are independently familiar are like those from the sciences in
that they can be a priori deduced from the microphysical facts (e.g., Chalmers
and Jackson, 2001). This is what supposedly enables us to provide “reductive
explanations” of the phenomena in question. If physicalists grant the asymme-
try while insisting that “phenomenal redness = r-fiber firing” is synthetically
true, then they are forced to abandon the prospect of giving a “reductive expla-
nation” that we would otherwise expect to be able to give. As a result, unless
they can provide some other independently motivated model for how “phe-
nomenal redness = r-fiber firing” could be synthetically true, their “suggestion
will seem at best ad hoc and mysterious and at worst incoherent” (Chalmers,
2002/2010, p. 117). The most natural conclusion is that “phenomenal redness
= r-fiber firing” is simply false. Or so the argument goes.14
This argumentative strategy can be generalized. No matter what we substi-
tute for “φ,” so long as it contains no irreducibly experiential terms, the result
13 See Kripke (1980, Lecture III) and Trogdon (2017, p. 2347). This claim is not uncontro-
versial; realizer functionalists such as Lewis (1980/2013) would reject it and instead maintain
that “phenomenal redness” is a non-rigid expression that picks out its referent in terms of a
role that it happens to play for the “appropriate population” (p. 219).
14 In response, some philosophers deny that there is an asymmetry between “water =
H2O” and “phenomenal redness = r-fiber firing” by arguing that it is not a priori that water
is the stuff around here that plays the watery role (e.g., Block and Stalnaker, 1999; Tye,
2009). Others accept the asymmetry but attempt to provide a physicalistically acceptable
explanation of it by appealing to the special nature of phenomenal concepts (e.g., Levin,
2019; Papineau, 1998). Still others argue that the connections from the less fundamental
to the more fundamental are generally not a priori knowable and thereby challenge the
assumption that synthetic identity statements such as “water = H2O” can be a priori deduced
from the microphysical facts (e.g., Schaffer, 2017). I am grateful to an anonymous referee
for urging me to clarify the open question argument against physicalism and acknowledge
some responses to it.
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of replacing each occurrence of “r-fiber firing” with an occurrence of “Λx.φ”
(“the property of being an x such that φ”) is a new two-step argument—just
as strong as the original—for the conclusion that phenomenal redness is dis-
tinct from Λx.φ.15
This puts pressure on versions of physicalism, such as the mind–brain iden-
tity theory and functionalism, which hold that phenomenal redness is identical
to a property that is definable in wholly non-experiential terms. Moreover, as
Rosen (2015, p. 206, n. 22) points out, it also puts pressure on the view that
it lies in the essence of phenomenal redness to be fully grounded in non-
experiential facts, for it is hard (if not impossible) to distinguish that view
from the reductive view that phenomenal redness is identical to a disjunctive
property constructed from each of its possible non-experiential grounds.
Jackson’s (1982) knowledge argument provides additional support for the
anti-physicalist premise (3). Mary is a brilliant color scientist who, having
spent her entire life inside a black-and-white room, has never experienced
color. She is also fully conceptually and logically competent, and by studying
the physics and neurophysiology of color experience, she has learned all the
general microphysical facts relevant to color experience and thereby deduced
every fact that is fully grounded in those microphysical facts—for short, she
knows all the physical facts about color experience. Yet, when Mary is released
from her room and sees a red rose for the first time, she makes a surprising
discovery: she learns what it is like to see red. Since Mary knew all the physical
facts about color—the argument continues—she must have learned a non-
physical fact. Therefore, there is at least one non-physical fact, and physicalism
is false.16
We can amplify this argument by clearly distinguishing two steps of epis-
temic progress that Mary takes all at once. Consider Nida-Rümelin’s (1995)
example of Marianna. Like Mary, Marianna has spent her entire life inside a
black-and-white room studying the physics and neurophysiology of color ex-
perience. Prior to her release, however, Marianna’s captors show her a series
of colored chips without telling her the names of those colors or anything
about the materials from which the chips are made. Upon seeing a blue chip,
Marianna learns what it is like to see blue. Yet, she still doesn’t know that
what it is like for normally sighted people to see the sky is similar (with re-
spect to color) to what it is like for her to see this. Marianna doesn’t gain
15 I use the uppercase “Λ” to distinguish “Λx ” from “λx,” which some use as a device for
forming complex predicates as opposed to names for properties (Fine, 2012, pp. 67–68).
16 Some philosophers respond by arguing that Mary doesn’t know all the physical facts
about color experience inside her black-and-white room (e.g., Alter, 1998; Moran, n.d.). Oth-
ers attempt to make sense of Mary’s apparent discovery while avoiding the anti-physicalist
conclusion by arguing that she only gains new know-how (e.g., Lewis, 1988/2004); that she
gains new knowledge-that by coming to know a previously known physical fact under a new
concept (e.g., Horgan, 1984); that she comes to bear a new (distinctive) relation of truth-apt
knowledge to a physical fact of which she already had (ordinary) knowledge-that (Pelczar,
2005); that she gains new knowledge by acquaintance of a physical property (e.g., Conee,
1994; Tye, 2009); or that she comes to base her knowledge-that of a previously known phys-
ical fact on her knowledge by acquaintance of a physical property (Grzankowski and Tye,
2019).
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this further item of knowledge until she is released from her room and sees
the sky for herself. Again, since Marianna knew all the physical facts about
color experience, it seems that she must have learned a non-physical fact. This
example threatens to undermine the old fact/new guise response to the knowl-
edge argument, since prior to her release, it is plausible that Marianna already
possessed whatever concepts we use to think about color experiences.
To be clear, I am not endorsing either of these two arguments against
physicalism here. There are a number of responses to these arguments that
merit careful consideration (see nn. 14 and 16), and I do not have the space
to do that in this paper. As I will argue in Section 4 below, my main point is
simply that if one of these arguments succeeds, then a parallel argument in
metaethics also succeeds.
While some philosophers use these arguments to support dualism, panpsy-
chists go on to argue against dualism. This brings us to premise (4). Nagel
(1979/2012) and Strawson (2006/2008) object to theories of mind that are
committed to “brute emergence.”17 While they sometimes characterize emer-
gence in epistemic terms, it is clear upon closer inspection that they are raising
a metaphysical objection. Thus, Nagel takes properties to be “truly” emergent
when they “appear at certain complex levels of organization but are not ex-
plainable in terms of any more fundamental properties, known or unknown,
of the constituents” of the systems that have those properties (p. 186). And
Strawson explicitly states that he uses the notion of “explicability” to express
“the idea that there must be something about the nature of the emerged-from
(and nothing else) in virtue of which the emerger emerges as it does and is
what it is” (p. 63; emphasis added). To put it in terms of metaphysical ground
and essence, a property Λx.φ is brutely emergent when it is instantiated by a
non-fundamental entity e and either (i) the fact that e instantiates Λx.φ is not
fully metaphysically grounded in the instantiations of more fundamental prop-
erties by ultimates or (ii) the fact that e instantiates Λx.φ is not explainable
in terms of the essences of things.
Strawson (2006/2008) argues that there is no analogy “of the right size
or momentousness” to give us “any imaginative grip on the supposed move
from the non-experiential to the experiential” (p. 63), while Nagel (1979/2012)
maintains that brute emergence is nowhere else to be found in nature. Thus,
if dualism is committed to brute emergence, it is thereby committed to a mo-
mentous leap that is unlike anything else in nature. But since dualism entails
that at least some facts about o-experience are metaphysically ungrounded, it
is hard to see how dualists can avoid a commitment to brute emergence. After
all, o-phenomenal properties appear to be instantiated by non-fundamental
17 Strawson’s (2006/2008) objection appears to be directed at a version of non-reductive
physicalism rather than property dualism, which he claims “is strictly incoherent (or just a
way of saying that there are two very different kinds of properties) in so far as it purports
to be genuinely distinct from substance dualism” (p. 73). However, since Strawson’s objec-
tion has as much force against dualism as it does against certain versions of non-reductive
physicalism (see, e.g., p. 62, n. 24), I have applied his discussion to premise (4).
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entities, such as the o-experiences of human organisms and other complex
systems.
The best case scenario for dualism is that o-phenomenal properties are
governed by “irreducible contingent laws connecting [o-phenomenal properties
to] complex organic states” (Nagel, 1979/2012, p. 194). Smart (1959) famously
complained that such “nomological danglers” would be unlike anything “so far
known in science” and “have a queer ‘smell’ to them” (p. 143). Even the best
case scenario for dualism runs into an analogue of Goff’s (2017) simplicity
argument for panpsychism.18 The supposition that there are irreducible psy-
chophysical laws “leads us to complexity, discontinuity, and mystery” (p. 170).
Dualism runs afoul of the “theoretical imperative to form as simple and unified
a view as is consistent with the data” (p. 170).19
Again, as with the arguments against physicalism, I am not endorsing the
simplicity argument against dualism here. As will become clear in Section 4
below, my main point is simply that if the simplicity argument gives us a
compelling reason to reject dualism, then a parallel argument in metaethics
gives us a compelling reason to reject robust realism.20
18 I am indebted to an anonymous referee for inspiring me to make this connection.
19 That said, it is unclear why the psychophysical laws of dualism should make for a theory
that is any less simple or unified than versions of non-reductive physicalism (Pautz, forth-
coming). Moreover, as an anonymous referee pointed out to me, the dualist might respond
to the simplicity argument by insisting that the holding of a fundamental psychophysical
law does not cry out for explanation in its own right. By analogy, if the occurrence of an
event is causally explained by the occurrence of its cause in accordance with a causal law,
we aren’t inclined to think that the holding of the causal law itself requires a causal explana-
tion. Similarly, the dualist might maintain, if the o-phenomenal facts are naturally grounded
in microphysical facts in accordance with fundamental psychophysical laws, we shouldn’t
expect the holding of each fundamental psychophysical law to have an explanation. Pro-
ponents of the simplicity argument can push back against the dualist’s response in several
ways. First, the explanandum of a causal explanation is the occurrence of an event. If causal
laws are not events, then it is a category error to suggest that the holding of a causal law
has a causal explanation. That is arguably why the holding of a causal law is not apt to be
causally explained. By contrast, it is not obvious that the natural grounding relation imposes
any constraints on the (distinct) facts that it can relate. This calls into question whether
the analogy with causal explanation actually supports the conclusion that the holding of a
fundamental psychophysical law is not apt to be naturally grounded. Second, even if the the
holding of a fundamental psychophysical law is not apt to be naturally grounded, it doesn’t
follow that it is not apt to be metaphysically grounded. Consider causal explanation again.
While we aren’t inclined to think that the holding of a causal law requires a causal expla-
nation, we might nonetheless assess a theory for whether the causal laws that it posits are
such that their holding is metaphysically explained by more fundamental facts. The analogy
with causal explanation does not alleviate the worry that the holding of each fundamental
psychophysical law has no metaphysical explanation, because even in the case of causal ex-
planation, we expect the holding of a causal law to have a metaphysical explanation (say,
in terms of more fundamental laws of nature). Third, even if the holding of a fundamental
psychophysical law is not apt to be explained, this only alleviates the worry that dualism
leads us to mystery. It does not alleviate the worry that dualism leads us to discontinuity
or complexity (Pautz 2015, forthcoming). Similar remarks apply to my discussion of robust
realism in Section 4 below.
20 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me to emphasize that my main points do
not require the arguments against physicalism or dualism to succeed.
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In short, the arguments against physicalism and dualism push us in differ-
ent directions. The master argument for panpsychism gives us a reason to find
a new way forward. Perhaps panpsychism is that way.
4 The moral parody argument for panmoralism
Or perhaps not. With the master argument for panpsychism clearly laid out,
the parallels in metaethics are striking. Let’s say that an o-moral fact [P ]
arises from some natural facts ∆ just in case the facts in ∆ either normatively
ground [P ] or metaphysically ground [P ] (on their own or together with a fact
about o-moral or o-normative properties, such as the holding of a moral law).
We can now construct a parallel argument concerning o-moral facts:
(1′) Either o-moral facts arise from natural facts, or o-moral facts are fully
metaphysically grounded in u-normative facts (on their own or together
with u-physical facts).
(2′) If o-moral facts arise from natural facts, then either naturalism or robust
realism is true.
(3′) Naturalism is false: it completely leaves out normativity.
(4′) Robust realism is also false: it requires brute emergence.
(5′) So, o-moral facts are fully metaphysically grounded in u-normative facts
(on their own or together with u-physical facts).
Call this the “moral parody argument.” The conclusion of this argument is
panmoralism, a view according to which every obtaining o-moral fact is (par-
tially) metaphysically grounded in facts about normative properties that we
do not pre-theoretically countenance and of whose natures we are at present
largely ignorant (“u-normative” properties). These theoretical normative prop-
erties are the metaethical analogues of the u-phenomenal properties posited
by panpsychists, and they are hypothesized to be fundamental properties of
the ultimates. Thus, if electrons are fundamental objects countenanced by a
completed physics, then panmoralists hold that electrons are fundamentally
normative in the sense that they instantiate normative properties and their
instantiating those properties has no full metaphysical explanation.
I include “parody” in the label for the above argument to highlight the
apparent absurdity of its conclusion and to draw attention to how it reaches
that conclusion by parity of reasoning with the master argument for panpsy-
chism. Like the master argument for panpsychism, the moral parody argument
is valid. And once we set aside the competitors to naturalism, robust realism,
and panmoralism, premises (1′) and (2′) should be relatively uncontroversial.
The crucial premises are (3′) and (4′), and the same sorts of considerations that
apparently support premises (3) and (4) of the master argument for panpsy-
chism also apparently support these crucial premises.
Let’s start with (3′). Like its counterpart in the philosophy of mind, many
philosophers take (3′) to be obvious. Moreover, some influential arguments
against physicalism in the philosophy of mind can be adapted to argue against
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naturalism in metaethics (and vice versa). We already saw that there is an
open question argument against physicalism. Now consider the metaethical
statement “goodness = the property of being something we desire to desire”
(“goodness = desirability” for short). The first step of the metaethical par-
allel to the open question argument against physicalism establishes that this
metaethical statement is synthetically true (if true at all).
However, as Horgan and Timmons (1991) argue, “goodness = desirability”
seems to differ from synthetic identity statements familiar from the sciences.21
Recall the statement “water = H2O.” The standard line on this statement
is that “water” rigidly designates H2O. Someone who is tempted to reject
this view has to deal with Putnam’s (1975) famous “Twin Earth” argument.
Putnam invites us to imagine a distant planet, Twin Earth, that is exactly like
Earth in every respect with one exception: the stuff that plays the watery role
on Twin Earth isn’t H2O but rather some distinct chemical kind with similar
observable properties. Putnam predicts that competent English speakers have
a strong semantic intuition that Twin Earthlings don’t designate with their
twin-word “water” what we designate with our word “water.” This intuition is
often taken to be strong defeasible evidence for the semantic hypothesis that
our word “water” rigidly designates H2O.
But now consider Moral Twin Earth, a distant planet that is similar to
Earth in every respect except that twin-uses of the twin-word “goodness” are
causally regulated by a natural property that is distinct from desirability.
Horgan and Timmons (1991) predict that, unlike with Putnam’s Twin Earth
scenario, competent English speakers have a strong semantic intuition that
Moral Twin Earthlings do designate with their twin-word “goodness” what
we designate with our word “goodness.” Thus, if we were to travel to Moral
Twin Earth and discover that there is an act that we take to have what we
call “goodness” but that Moral Twin Earthlings take to lack what they call
“goodness,” it is plausible that we would regard this as a substantive moral
dispute, not a merely verbal disagreement. Horgan and Timmons argue that
this semantic intuition provides strong defeasible evidence for the conclusion
that the statement “goodness = desirability” is not synthetically true. And as
we saw with the parallel argument in the philosophy of mind, this argumen-
tative strategy can be generalized to put pressure on a variety of naturalistic
theories in metaethics.
What about the knowledge argument? As Pelczar (2009) and Yetter-
Chappell and Chappell (2013) independently point out, we can construct a
metaethical parallel. Moral Mary is a brilliant scientist who is fully conceptu-
ally and logically competent. Despite what her name might suggest, however,
21 Another respect in which the putative identity between goodness and desirability seems
to differ from standard synthetic identities is that it is hard to see how it could be a priori
deduced from the microphysical facts (even if all other o-moral facts can be). This makes the
naturalist vulnerable to the objection (summarized in Section 3 above) that their identity
statements are ad hoc and mysterious.
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she has spent much of her life without moral concepts.22 By consulting the
physical and social sciences, she has learned every general natural fact rele-
vant to morality and thereby deduced every fact that is fully grounded in those
natural facts—for short, she knows all the natural facts about morality. Later
in life, she agrees to have a brain operation devised to equip her with moral
concepts. When the operation is over, she finds that she is suddenly able to
conceptualize acts as wrong. She may even learn that it lies in the essence
of wrongness that wrong actions have wrong-makers (Fine, 2012, pp. 77–78).
Yet, much like Marianna, there is still much that Moral Mary doesn’t know.
In particular, for a wide range of acts, she doesn’t know which of them (if any)
are wrong. For despite her full conceptual and logical competence, she doesn’t
know which natural properties are wrong-makers.
According to Yetter-Chappell and Chappell (2013), Moral Mary’s situation
is possible because there are “many different internally-coherent moral view-
points that conceptually competent and empirically-informed agents might
hold” (p. 872). Because Moral Mary is initially unable to decide between,
say, consequentialism and deontology, she doesn’t believe that certain acts are
wrong and thus doesn’t know that they are wrong (Pelczar, 2009, p. 27). Sim-
ilar to Marianna when she sees the sky for the first time, Moral Mary seems to
learn something new when she acquires certain substantive “rational insights
of a kind that go beyond the mere application of a new conceptual apparatus
to an old domain of facts” (Yetter-Chappell and Chappell, 2013, p. 871). She
needs these rational insights in order to engage in a process of wide reflective
equilibrium and thereby acquire knowledge about the moral status of certain
actions. (If her captors were to wire her in such a way that she starts with
the wrong moral intuitions, then she arguably wouldn’t acquire this knowl-
edge.) But prior to acquiring these substantive rational insights, Moral Mary
possessed all the relevant moral concepts, and she knew all the natural facts
about morality. Thus, in acquiring these substantive rational insights—the ar-
gument continues—she must have learned a non-natural fact. Therefore, there
is at least one non-natural fact, and naturalism is false.
The example of Marianna purports to show that even a fully conceptually
and logically competent subject who possesses all the relevant phenomenal
concepts and has complete knowledge of the physical facts can still be ignorant
of some phenomenal facts, and the anti-physicalist infers from this that there
are non-physical facts. Similarly, the example of Moral Mary purports to show
that even a fully conceptually and logically competent subject who possesses
all the relevant moral concepts and has complete knowledge of the natural
22 There is an interesting question of what exactly is required for one to possess moral
concepts, but this question is largely irrelevant to the argument. The point of the example
is that just as Mary should be able to learn everything there is to know about color without
undergoing color experiences (if physicalism is true), so too Moral Mary should be able to
learn everything there is to know about morality without sharing whatever it is that we
have (and some other conscious subjects lack) that explains why we possess moral concepts
(if naturalism is true). Thanks to A. B. Jimenez-Cordero for helpful discussion on this issue.
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facts can still be ignorant of some moral facts, and the anti-naturalist infers
from this that there are non-natural facts.
Of course, naturalists needn’t take these arguments lying down. Pelczar
(2009) defends naturalism by developing an old relatum/new relation strategy.
Yetter-Chappell and Chappell (2013) defend naturalism by developing a moral
concept strategy. Perhaps naturalism even wins the day. My point here isn’t
that naturalism is false. Rather, it is that we have just about as much reason
to think that naturalism is false as we have to think that physicalism is false.
So what about premise (4′)? Suppose that, with the possible exception of
o-experience, brute emergence is nowhere else to be found in nature. It follows
that if robust realism is committed to brute emergence, it is thereby committed
to a momentous leap that is unlike (almost) anything else in nature. But since
robust realism entails that at least some facts about o-moral or o-normative
properties are metaphysically ungrounded, it is very hard to see how robust
realists can avoid a commitment to brute emergence. After all, o-moral and
o-normative properties appear to be instantiated by non-fundamental entities,
such as particular actions and events.
As with dualism, then, the best case scenario for robust realism is that
o-moral properties are governed by irreducible moral or normative laws con-
necting o-moral properties to natural properties. These “normative danglers”
are analogous to psychophysical laws, and in their absence, there can be no
full metaphysical explanation of other o-moral facts. This is a way of con-
struing the complaint (similar to Smart’s complaint vis-à-vis psychophysical
laws) that “moral facts would be ‘queer’, in that unlike other facts they can-
not be explained in terms of arrangements of matter, or logical constructions
out of sense-data, or whatever the particular theorist takes to be the general
form of real things” (Mackie, 1946, p. 78). Hence, even the best case scenario
for moral realism runs into a metaethical parallel of the simplicity argument
against dualism. The supposition that there are irreducible moral or norma-
tive laws leads us to complexity, discontinuity, and mystery. Along with other
theoretical imperatives, Occam’s razor cuts against robust realism and gives
us a reason to find another way.
5 In defense of the incredulous stare
But should we really think that panmoralism is that way? It is tempting
to simply end the paper with an incredulous stare—and perhaps throw in a
raised eyebrow for good measure. Surely panmoralism is complete and utter
woo-woo! I am inclined to believe that this is the right reaction to have, and it
has implications for panpsychism. So far, I have argued that the same sorts of
considerations that apparently support the premises of the master argument
for panpsychism also apparently support the premises of the moral parody
argument for panmoralism. This suggests that if moral realism is true—an
assumption to which I return in Section 7—then the two arguments stand or
fall together. Therefore, on the assumption that moral realism is true, if the
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incredulous stare is a reason to think that the moral parody argument for
panmoralism fails, then it is also a reason to think that the master argument
for panpsychism fails.
Why does panmoralism invite an incredulous stare? It isn’t simply that the
view attributes normative properties to objects characterized by physics. Per-
haps each electron has the normative property of being such that it shouldn’t
be used to bring about the mass destruction of a densely populated city. There
needn’t be anything especially strange about that. For if a particular electron
has such a normative property, it is plausible that there are more fundamental
facts pertaining to the rights, interests, or preferences of persons that par-
tially explain the fact that the electron has that property. Part of what makes
panmoralism seem so strange by comparison is its claim that the ultimates
are fundamentally normative—that they instantiate normative properties and
their instantiating those properties has no full metaphysical explanation.
Panpsychists might object that if consciousness is normatively significant,
then this is a straightforward consequence of plain old panpsychism; thus,
panmoralism is no stranger than panpsychism, and panpsychists have nothing
more to worry about. However, even if we grant that it follows from panpsy-
chism that the ultimates are fundamentally normative, it doesn’t follow (as
panmoralism holds) that they instantiate u-normative properties: hypotheti-
cal normative properties that we do not pre-theoretically countenance and of
whose natures we are at present largely ignorant. To the extent that these
distinctive posits contribute to the strangeness of panmoralism, panmoralism
is still stranger than whatever follows from panpsychism under plausible as-
sumptions about the normative significance of consciousness.23
But as the saying goes, one philosopher’s modus tollens is another’s modus
ponens. If any moral realists find themselves completely unmoved by the in-
credulous stare, then they can consider this paper a friendly invitation to crit-
ically explore a largely unrecognized metaethical view.24 They should proceed
with caution, however. Panmoralism faces several problems, and these prob-
lems compound with those that panpsychism already faces. Taken together,
23 All that said, it is far from obvious that it does follow from panpsychism under plausible
assumptions about the normative significance of consciousness that the ultimates instanti-
ate normative properties and their instantiating those properties has no full metaphysical
explanation. First, while it is plausible that certain phenomenal properties have norma-
tive significance, it is debatable that all of them do. Second, it is controversial that when
a conscious experience instantiates a normative property, the instantiation of that norma-
tive property by that experience has no full metaphysical explanation. Finally, even if the
ultimates undergo conscious experiences that have normative properties, it doesn’t follow
that the ultimates themselves have those normative properties. I am grateful to Josh De-
ver, Hedda Hassel Mørch, Bradford Saad, Joseph C. Schmid, and an anonymous referee for
helpful comments that led to the inclusion of the preceding discussion of the incredulous
stare.
24 An anonymous referee suggested that Philip Goff has defended a view along the lines of
panmoralism. In personal communication, Goff clarified that while he has presented material
arguing that panqualityism helps solve an epistemological problem for robust realism (as
opposed to panmoralism), his thoughts on moral epistemology have subsequently shifted
and he may not pursue the original material in future work.
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they build a strong cumulative case for taking the moral parody argument for
panmoralism to be a reductio ad absurdum of the master argument for panpsy-
chism. In the remainder of this section, I motivate the incredulous stare by
laying out some of these problems. But first I anticipate a maneuver that may
well have occurred to the reader.
Suppose that panmoralism is much more problematic than panpsychism.
It might then be objected that this alone provides the panpsychist with a
basis for consistently endorsing the master argument for panpsychism while
disavowing the moral parody argument for panmoralism. The following anal-
ogy should dramatize the mistake in this objection. One way of implementing
the companions in guilt strategy for defending moral realism is to argue that
the arguments for moral error theory overgeneralize to support an implausible
error theory about all of normativity. Now clearly it would be silly for moral
error theorists to respond to this objection by simply insisting that since nor-
mative error theory is much more problematic than moral error theory, one can
consistently endorse the arguments for the latter while disavowing the argu-
ments for the former. The whole point of the companions in guilt strategy is to
establish that the arguments for moral error theory overgeneralize to support
other problematic positions. The more problematic those positions turn out to
be, so much the worse for moral error theory (Cowie, 2018, sec. 2.2). The com-
panions in guilt strategy challenges moral error theorists to explain how the
relevant parallels can be broken or else show why the apparently absurd con-
sequences of their arguments are not as implausible as they might first seem.
Similar remarks apply to the moral parody argument against panpsychism.
I now turn to some problems for panmoralism. I begin by discussing an
objection that—upon closer examination—fails to raise a serious problem for
panmoralism. However, it is instructive to begin with this objection. First, it
suggests how the moral parody argument can be adapted to parody another
influential argument for panpsychism. Second, it points in the direction of an
objection that does raise very serious problems for panmoralism. Finally, it
shows why panmoralism has an advantage over a position recently defended
by Bohn (2018), which I discuss in the next section.
In order to lay out this objection, let’s return to premise (1) of the master
argument for panpsychism. This premise ignores non-panpsychist versions of
Russellian monism, a worldview inspired by the writings of Bertrand Rus-
sell. It consists of three central theses. The first is that physics only reveals
the abstract and structural features of the ultimates but not their “intrinsic”
or “categorical nature” (the “quiddities”). As Chalmers (2015/2017) puts it,
“Physics tells us a lot about what mass does—it resists acceleration, attracts
other masses, and so on—but it tells us nothing about what mass intrinsically
is. We might say that physics tells us what the mass role is, but it does not
tell us what property plays this role” (pp. 253–54). The second is that the
ultimates must have some fundamental quiddities that play the pertinent mi-
crophysical roles and underlie microphysical structure. The third is that the
fundamental quiddities on which physics is silent play an important role in
generating o-experience.
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Russellian panpsychists maintain that u-phenomenal properties play the
pertinent microphysical roles and underlie microphysical structure. However,
not all Russellian monists are panpsychists. Some hold that the quiddities are
non-subjective qualities of the same type as those presented to us in subjec-
tive experience (such as the redness involved in experiences of red). Others
hold that the quiddities are neither subjective nor qualitative but somehow
intrinsically suited to generating o-experience. Like dualism, non-panpsychist
versions of Russellian monism confront Goff’s (2017) simplicity argument:
We now have a theoretical choice. We can either suppose that the cat-
egorical nature of [the ultimates] . . . is constituted of properties of the
kind we are acquainted with, or we can suppose that they have some
entirely unknown categorical nature. On the former supposition, the na-
ture of macroscopic things is continuous with the nature of microscopic
things. The latter supposition leads us to complexity, discontinuity,
and mystery. The theoretical imperative to form as simple and unified
a view as is consistent with the data leads us quite straightforwardly in
the direction of panpsychism. (pp. 169–70)
This argument lends indirect support to premise (1) of the master argument
for panpsychism by providing a reason to set aside non-panpsychist versions of
Russellian monism. It also suggests that anyone in the market for a “pan-ism”
should purchase that pan-ism together with Russellian monism as a package
deal.
Now for the objection to panmoralism. The simplicity argument puts pres-
sure on panmoralists to maintain that u-normative properties play the perti-
nent microphysical roles and underlie microphysical structure. Yet, it may seem
difficult to understand how that could be. (The retort “Oh, it be!” is not very
reassuring.) One way of bringing this out is to recall Hume’s (1739–40/2007)
famous claim that an “ought” cannot be derived from an “is.” The Russellian
panmoralist is committed to saying something that seems far stranger than
the denial of Hume’s claim: the natural can be derived from the normative!
In short, unlike panpsychism, panmoralism seems to be incompatible with
Russellian monism.
However, insofar as the pertinent microphysical roles are causal, panmoral-
ists will surely respond that all it takes for the natural to be derivable from
the normative is for u-normative properties to figure into complete causal ex-
planations of u-physical events. The previous objection amounts to no more
than an inference from the controversial premise that normative properties are
causally inert to the conclusion that panmoralism is incompatible with Russel-
lian monism. But why should panmoralists accept that premise? Many natu-
ralists reject it.25 And while some robust realists accept it, once panmoralism
25 According to Sturgeon (1986), for instance, “We often clearly attribute causal efficacy to
them [moral properties]. We point to injustice, along with poverty, as a cause of revolution,
or of pressure for reform; we think that Hitler’s depravity led him to do a variety of terrible
things; and we suppose that moral decency keeps other people from doing things like that,
and would have kept him from doing them if he had been decent” (p. 75).
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is on the table, it is unclear why moral realists who reject naturalism should
be committed to it.
This response suggests how the moral parody argument can be adapted
to parody arguments for the conclusion that panpsychism avoids a causal ex-
clusion problem for dualism (Chalmers, 2015/2017; Goff, 2017). While I do
not have the space to develop it in detail here, these arguments also have
a metaethical parallel. In brief, since robust realists must deny that o-moral
facts are fully metaphysically grounded in microphysical facts, it seems that
they cannot hold that o-moral facts are causally efficacious without either in-
curring a commitment to systematic causal overdetermination or abandoning
the causal closure of the u-physical. But since it is open to panmoralists to
maintain that u-normative properties play the most fundamental microphys-
ical roles, they can hold that o-moral facts inherit causal relevance from the
u-normative facts (and/or u-physical facts) in which they are fully grounded,
thereby avoiding objectionable overdetermination and preserving the causal
closure of the u-physical. Thus, if panpsychism can avoid a causal exclusion
problem for dualism, then panmoralism can avoid a parallel problem for robust
realism.26
While the previous objection is dialectically unpersuasive, it points in the
direction of an objection to panmoralism that cannot be so easily dismissed.
It is widely held that the moral globally supervenes on the natural: no two
metaphysically possible worlds can differ in moral respects without also dif-
fering in natural respects.27 Panmoralism seems to be incompatible with this
thesis (Bohn, 2018, pp. 4120–21). Unless there are metaphysically necessary
connections between u-normative properties and the microphysical roles that
they putatively play, then on the face of it, there is a metaphysically possi-
ble natural/amoral world that is exactly like the actual world in all natural
respects but in which no ultimates have u-normative properties and there are
no obtaining moral facts.
This raises two very serious worries for panmoralism. The first is epistemo-
logical (Bader, 2017, pp. 110–11). If natural/amoral worlds are metaphysically
possible, then we have to take seriously the epistemic possibility that the ac-
tual world is one of them. Since these worlds are empirically indistinguishable
from worlds at which moral facts obtain, we can’t rule out this epistemic pos-
sibility a posteriori. But if it is metaphysically contingent that u-normative
properties play microphysical roles, then it is also very hard to see how we
could rule out this epistemic possibility a priori. The failure of the global su-
pervenience thesis also raises an explanatory worry. Given the failure of that
thesis, the putative fact that we find ourselves in a world that happens to
align with moral realism seems to be a matter of sheer luck that cries out for
26 I am inclined to take this to be a reductio ad absurdum of the causal argument for
panpsychism, but that is a topic for another paper.
27 For two rare detractors, see Fine (2002/2005) and Rosen (2020).
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explanation, and it seems that the panmoralist is forced to admit that it is
just a brute fact that we won the moral lottery.28
Finally, panmoralism faces a dilemma (Pautz, 2015). Either o-moral prop-
erties are reducible to complex u-normative-involving properties, or they
aren’t.29 Suppose that they are. In that case, unlike on naturalism, o-moral
properties turn out to have “hidden essences” linking them to fundamental
u-normative properties. But if we’re forced to concede that, then it is unclear
why we should accept the anti-naturalist premise (3′) of the moral parody
argument for panmoralism as opposed to adopting a naturalist view according
to which o-moral properties have hidden essences linking them to properties
that are either non-normative or definable in wholly non-normative terms. Like
naturalism, reductive panmoralism is open to the Moral Twin Earth objection
(just imagine a Moral Twin Earth on which uses of moral terms are causally
regulated by slightly different complex u-normative-involving properties or by
natural properties that are not u-normative-involving at all). And if the nat-
ural/moral global supervenience thesis is false, reductive panmoralism ampli-
fies the challenge of providing a physicalistically acceptable account of how
it is that moral terms determinately refer to complex u-normative-involving
properties rather than to whatever properties they denote in natural/amoral
worlds, given that these worlds are empirically indistinguishable.30
The panmoralist might respond that reductions of o-moral properties to
complex u-normative-involving properties are less problematic than standard
naturalistic reductions, because o-moral and u-normative properties have “ho-
mogeneous” natures. The history of metaethics shows why this response is
unpersuasive. Robust realists of various stripes all agree that o-moral proper-
ties have homogeneous natures insofar as they are all essentially moral. That
doesn’t stop them from debating whether deontic facts, for example, can be
reduced to evaluative facts (or vice versa).
By contrast, suppose that o-moral properties are irreducible. The instan-
tiations of complex u-normative-involving properties might nonetheless fully
ground the instantiations of o-moral properties. However, in the paradigm
cases, ground-theoretic connections are explainable with reference to the
essences of the grounded items. If o-moral properties don’t have hidden
essences, then panmoralism appears to be committed to something very simi-
lar to the brute emergence it is meant to avoid: while the robust realist posits
28 Pautz (2015, sec. 4) argues that Russellian monism confronts a similar problem of “psy-
chophysical luck,” while Dreier (2019, sec. 2.5) independently argues that the view that the
most fundamental moral facts are metaphysically contingent implausibly leads to widespread
“moral luck.”
29 I use the phrase “reducible to” as a placeholder for either identity or real definition; the
two are (arguably) related (Rosen, 2015, p. 190, n. 2; see also Correia, 2017). See Pautz
(2015, pp. 5–6) for a helpful distinction between “quiddity-involving” and “quiddity-neutral”
properties; in this terminology, reductive panmoralists hold that (i) o-moral or o-normative
properties are quiddity-involving and (ii) u-normative properties are among the fundamental
quiddities on which physics is silent.
30 Drawing from Papineau (2003) and Sider (2001), Pautz (2015) develops a similar prob-
lem of reference for Russellian monism.
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brute normative or moral laws connecting o-moral properties to natural prop-
erties, panmoralists posit brute grounding connections between the instantia-
tions of o-moral properties and u-normative properties. These brute grounding
connections lead us to complexity, discontinuity, and mystery.
At this point, the panmoralist might object that grounding connections
do not cry out for explanation in their own right, and even if they do, they
do not require essence-based explanations. This is a large issue of ongoing
controversy, and a detailed examination of it will have to wait for another
paper.31 However, I am willing to concede that the panmoralist can blunt the
second horn of the dilemma by holding that grounding connections do not need
essence-based explanations. Having made this concession, I have three points
in service of showing that this horn remains sharp enough to put pressure on
the panmoralist.
First, some philosophers will view the panmoralist’s proposal as an unfor-
tunate way out of the dilemma. Brute grounding seems uncomfortably close to
brute emergence. As with supervenience relations, it just seems arbitrary and
unsatisfying to posit grounding connections without saying anything more.
Successful essence-based explanations, by contrast, are arguably distinctively
non-arbitrary and maximally satisfying (e.g., Dasgupta, 2014, p. 580).
Second, even if the panmoralist’s proposal circumvents the charge that
the non-reductive panmoralist’s grounding connections lead us to mystery,
there is still a case to be made that these grounding connections add to the
discontinuity and complexity of the non-reductive panmoralist’s theory in the
way that fundamental moral or normative laws add to the discontinuity and
complexity of robust realism and fundamental psychophysical laws add to the
discontinuity and complexity of dualism (Pautz, 2015, forthcoming).
Third, the panmoralist’s proposal may come at a dialectical cost. Recall
that one way of motivating the open question argument against physicalism
in the philosophy of mind and naturalism in metaethics is to inductively infer
from the premise that paradigmatic synthetic identities have certain features
to the conclusion that all synthetic identities have those features. There is a
31 For now, I briefly sketch three related responses that can be given to this objection. First,
the growing literature on what Litland (2017) calls the “Problem of Iterated Ground”—the
question of what (if anything) grounds the facts about what grounds what—suggests that
grounding connections are apt to be metaphysically explained. After all, the problem arises
in part because there are reasons to believe that the facts about what grounds what can
and should be grounded (e.g., Litland, 2017, sec. 3). Second, Dasgupta (2014) and Rosen
(2017a,b) have argued that the best solution to the Problem of Iterated Ground is to take the
facts about what grounds what to be partially grounded in and thus partially metaphysically
explained by essentialist facts. Third, there is an important question of what distinguishes
metaphysical explanation from scientific explanation. Rosen (2017a) has provided (in my
view, compelling) reasons to think that the most plausible answer to this question is that a
fact is metaphysically grounded in some facts only if that grounding connection is mediated
by the essence of the grounded. But if that is right, it is very natural to go a step further
and conclude that all metaphysical explanations admit of a further explanation that some
scientific explanations do not—namely, an essence-based explanation. Contrary to Dasgupta
(2014) and Rosen (2017a,b), however, we needn’t take essence-based explanation to be a
type of grounding explanation. According to Lowe (2012), “We should regard essence-based
explanation just as one more distinctive species of explanation” (p. 938).
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similar inductive inference to be drawn from the premise that paradigmatic
grounding connections are explainable with reference to the essences of the
grounded items to the conclusion that all grounding connections are explain-
able with reference to the essences of the grounded items. If the panmoralist’s
maneuver out of the dilemma is legitimate, then it is hard to see why it isn’t
similarly legitimate for physicalists and naturalists to hold that their synthetic
identities needn’t involve “Twin-Earthable” terms or be a priori deducible from
the microphysical facts. In short, the panmoralist’s proposed way out of the
dilemma may weaken the case for panmoralism in metaethics (and, by parity
of reasoning, the case for panpsychism in the philosophy of mind).
The preceding discussion may invite another general concern. Suppose that
the panmoralist simply concedes that there are brute grounding connections
between the instantiations of o-moral and u-normative properties. If the alter-
native is to hold that nothing fully metaphysically grounds the instantiations
of o-moral properties by non-fundamental entities, then the panmoralist might
still declare victory. Perhaps a theory that posits brute grounding connections
between facts at different levels is ceteris paribus superior to a theory that
doesn’t posit any grounding connections between those facts at all.
In response to this concern, I grant for the sake of argument that non-
reductive panmoralism has an advantage over certain metaethical theories.
However, the dialectical situation in metaethics is more complex than the
previous concern makes it seem. As I explained in Section 2, it is open to
robust realists to hold that the instantiation of every o-moral property is fully
metaphysically grounded in natural facts together with fundamental normative
or moral laws. Panmoralists and normative bridge law robust realists, as we
might call them, can agree that the instantiation of every o-moral property by
a non-fundamental entity is partially metaphysically grounded in fundamental
normative facts. The main difference between them is that for the panmoralist,
these fundamental facts include the instantiations of hypothetical normative
properties by ultimates, whereas for the normative bridge law robust realist,
these fundamental facts include (lawful) generalizations linking ordinary moral
properties to ordinary normative properties. It is hard to see why this should
make a difference to whether the one theory is any less complex, discontinuous,
or mysterious than the other.32
6 Collective pluralized pannormism
Bohn (2018) constructs an argument that is similar to the moral parody argu-
ment for panmoralism, but rather than taking it to be a reductio ad absurdum
of a parallel argument for panpsychism, he goes on to defend two related posi-
tions that he calls “collective pluralized pannormism” and “collective pluralized
panpsychism,” respectively. It might be objected that these are the positions
32 I am indebted to an anonymous referee for challenging me to address these general
worries about the dilemma for panmoralism. These same worries will arise when I present a
similar dilemma for pannormism in Section 6.
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that we ought to adopt. In this section, after raising some questions about a
general principle that is meant to motivate these positions, I argue that col-
lective pluralized pannormism (“pannormism” for short) faces all three of the
problems that I raised for panmoralism and amplifies the first of them. Again,
this suggests that we should take the moral parody argument to be a reductio
ad absurdum of the master argument for panpsychism.
According to Bohn (2018), pannormism can be motivated by a general
research program based on the following trickle-down principle:
TDP: (Fx ∧ ([Byy ] < [Bx ])) → Fyy,
where each occurrence of “x ” is to be replaced with an occurrence of a singular
term; each occurrence of “yy” is to be replaced with an occurrence of a plural
term; each occurrence of “F ” is to be replaced with an occurrence of a predicate
expressing a “metaphysically basic” property (“basic” for short); and “B ” means
“[has] being” (Bohn, 2018, p. 4112).33 In English, TDP is meant to express the
idea that if an object has a basic property, and the being of that object is
grounded in the being of a plurality of other objects, then those other objects
together have that property.
Bohn (2018) uses the phrase “metaphysically basic” for “sub-factual objects
and properties (and relations) whose being has no full metaphysical explana-
tion in other terms” (p. 4107, n. 1). Since Bohn appears to use the terms
“being” and “instantiation” interchangeably when talking about properties, I
take him to mean that a property Λx.φ is basic with respect to a particular
object o when o instantiates Λx.φ and there are no facts that do not contain
Λx.φ as a constituent such that they fully ground the fact that o instantiates
Λx.φ. It’s not clear what Bohn means by the “being” of an object (see my n.
38 below). However, it is worth noting that Bohn (2018) and I both assume
that grounding is a multigrade relation between facts (see, e.g., p. 4109, n.
9). As a result, since an expression of the form “the being of x ” is apt to be
mistook for a definite description or function term for something other than
a fact, a sentence of the form “the being of x is grounded in the being of yy”
is to be treated as shorthand for a sentence along the lines of “the fact that x
has being is grounded in the fact that yy have being.”
To illustrate TDP, suppose that badness is a basic property expressed by
the predicate “bad” instantiated by a particular epileptic seizure. According to
Bohn (2018), it follows from TDP that:
If the epileptic seizure is bad, and the being of the epileptic seizure
is grounded in the being of some uncontrolled, overactive neuron fir-
ings in the brain, then those uncontrolled, overactive neuron firings are
bad, and if the being of those uncontrolled, overactive neuron firings
are grounded in the being of some atomic behavior, then that atomic
behavior is bad, and if the being of that atomic behavior is grounded in
the being of some sub-atomic behavior, then that sub-atomic behavior
33 I have modified the original notation slightly to bring it in line with my own.
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is bad, and if the being of that sub-atomic behavior is grounded in . . .,
and so on possibly ad infinitum, without end. (p. 4112)
On this view, the predicate “bad” is “ ‘multigrade’ in the sense that it can take
both singular and plural subjects” (p. 4112, n. 14). As Bohn points out, the
claim that some neuron firings are bad is ambiguous between three different
readings. Bohn intends the collective reading: “Fyy iff all of yy together has F,
but no one of them individually has F” (p. 4113). Correspondingly, let’s say
that a plurality collectively has a property when the members of that plurality
together have that property, but no one of them individually has that property;
and that a property is a plural collective property when a plurality of objects
collectively has it. Importantly, a plurality isn’t supposed to be a further object:
“By standard plural logic, a plurality of objects is nothing but those objects”
(p. 4119).
Bohn (2018) maintains that if badness doesn’t trickle down in such circum-
stances, then it is emergent : “a metaphysically basic property whose instan-
tiator has a ground . . . but [whose] instantiation has no full explanation in
terms of that ground” (p. 4109). That is, even though the being of the seizure
is fully grounded in the being of the neuron firings, the fact that the seizure
has badness is not fully grounded in facts about those neuron firings.
With these preliminaries in place, we can now understand pannormism to
be the following view:
Pannormism: Some o-moral or o-normative properties are basic and gov-
erned by TDP.34 Thus, if one of those properties is instantiated by a
non-fundamental entity whose being is fully grounded in the being of
some ultimates, then those ultimates collectively have that property.
Suppose that there is a fundamental level of reality. Here’s the crucial differ-
ence between pannormism and panmoralism: the former, but not the latter,
takes at least some o-moral or o-normative properties to be instantiated by
some ultimates; the latter, but not the former, countenances an ontology of
u-normative properties.
As previously indicated, one of the central motivations for pannormism is
that it belongs to a more general research program based on TDP. This re-
search program is meant to solve a general problem of emergence by taking
basic properties instantiated by non-basic objects to “trickle down” indepen-
dently motivated grounding chains to more fundamental pluralities of objects
(Bohn, 2018, pp. 4111–12). Consequently, if TDP admits of counterexamples,
34 Quantifying into predicate position: ∃F ((Basic(F ) ∧ (Moral(F ) ∨ Normative(F ))) ∧
∀x∀yy((Fx ∧ ([Byy] < [Bx ])) → Fyy)). In order to capture the intended idea that basic
o-moral or o-normative properties are not “emergent” in Bohn’s (2018) sense, the view needs
to be complicated to specify that when a non-basic object has a basic o-moral or o-normative
property, the fact that it has that property is grounded in the fact that a more fundamental
plurality of objects (whose being grounds the being of that non-basic object) collectively has
that property: e.g., conjoin the previous existential generalization with ∀G∀z∀vv(((Basic(G)
∧ (Moral(G) ∨ Normative(G))) ∧ ((Gz ∧ ([Bvv ] < [Bz ]))))→ ([Gvv ] < [Gz ])) (Bohn, 2019,
p. 390).
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then that research program collapses and one of the central motivations for
pannormism falls with it. For this reason, it is worth pausing to consider
whether TDP holds in general.35
I will mention three cases that (depending on one’s broader philosophi-
cal views) seem to call TDP into question. The first of them, which Bohn
(2018) considers, is the case of consciousness. In a later (2019) paper, Bohn
provides a detailed defense of collective pluralized panpsychism, which holds
that some o-phenomenal properties are both basic and collectively instantiated
by certain pluralities. Collective pluralized panpsychism turns largely on the
assumption that it is possible for a plurality of things to collectively have an
o-phenomenal property. This assumption is controversial. Van Inwagen (1990)
famously rejects it: “Now, surely, planning for tomorrow or feeling pain can-
not be activities that a lot of simples can perform collectively, as simples can
collectively shine or collectively support a weight” (p. 118) (but see Rosen and
Dorr, 2002, p. 160). Moreover, O’Conaill (2021) provides reasons to think that
o-phenomenal properties are essentially subjective: their instantiations “are al-
ways like something for someone, a subject of experience” (p. 4). As a result,
collective pluralized panpsychism confronts what O’Conaill calls “the problem
of the plural subject”: the task of clarifying how a plurality of things can col-
lectively have an o-phenomenal property when we seem to have no prior grasp
of how that could be. To the extent that this is a compelling problem, the
usual arguments against physicalism about o-experience suggest that certain
o-phenomenal properties generate counterexamples to TDP.36
The second case involves what Moran (2018) calls “fundamental kinds.”
Moran proposes that certain objects fall under kinds by reference to which
we can specify what they are (as opposed to merely specifying how they are).
These fundamental kinds can in some sense determine the properties that their
instances may have (e.g., a proposition is the kind of thing that can have a
truth value, but not the kind of thing that can be colored). On this basis,
Moran proposes that, in some cases, the fact that an object has a property
grounds the fact that it has a further property only on the condition that it
falls under a certain fundamental kind. Moran argues that this notion of kind-
dependent grounding can help us make sense of certain puzzling cases, such as
those in which distinct coincident objects seem to share a physical property and
yet only one of them has a further property in virtue of having that physical
property. While this framework can be implemented in more than one way
35 Thanks to an anonymous referee for inspiring me to consider potential counterexamples
to TDP.
36 If the problem of the plural subject can be solved, thereby removing what some take
to be an important obstacle to mereological nihilism, the solution would bring into renewed
focus the question of why we should prefer collective pluralized panpsychism over a version of
eliminativism according to which there are no mereologically complex subjects of experience.
For there is a case to be made that considerations of parsimony favor eliminativism (e.g.,
Van Inwagen, 1994). However, Bohn (2014) defends the thesis of composition as identity and
would deny that considerations of parsimony favor eliminativism over collective pluralized
panpsychism. Not surprisingly, the question of whether mereology is “ontologically innocent”
is a matter of ongoing controversy.
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(e.g., Moran, 2021), Moran’s (2018) preferred solution requires the view that
(some) “fundamental kinds are ground-theoretically fundamental since their
instantiation is ungrounded” (p. 371). This may spell trouble for TDP. For
consider Moran’s case of the statue and the lump of clay that constitutes it.
If the lump of clay doesn’t fall under the fundamental kind of the statue,
as Moran suggests, then surely the plurality of which the statue is composed
doesn’t fall under that kind either. But if the being of the statue is grounded in
the being of the plurality of which it is composed, then a basic kind instantiated
by a non-basic object fails to trickle down the grounding chain to the more
fundamental plurality of which that non-basic object is composed, and TDP
fails.37
Finally, consider the property of being a set. Suppose that {Socrates, Plato}
has this property. On the face of it, the property of being a set is essentially
singular. Nonetheless, there is a case to be made that the being of {Socrates,
Plato} is grounded in the being of Socrates and Plato. But if the property of
being a set is basic, then it follows from these assumptions that TDP fails.
All that said, these purported counterexamples are only as compelling as
the assumptions on which they’re based.38 Some philosophers will insist that,
for each of these cases, TDP is more plausible than the set of assumptions
required for the purported counterexample to succeed. I have presented each
case here for the consideration of those who are independently attracted to
those assumptions. However, in the remainder of this section, I will simply
assume that TDP does not admit of successful counterexamples. Instead, I
will focus on pannormism and argue that it suffers from the same problems
that I raised for panmoralism.
Here’s the first problem for pannormism that I will discuss. As I pointed
out in Section 5 above, the simplicity argument suggests that anyone in the
37 Needless to say, Moran’s (2018) metaphysical framework is not uncontroversial, and
proponents of other metaphysical frameworks (including the essence-based framework intro-
duced in Section 2 above) may prefer to pursue different solutions to the problem cases that
Moran considers (assuming they take them to be genuinely problematic in the first place).
38 They also turn in part on how TDP is to be interpreted. Recall that since grounding is
a multigrade relation between facts, a sentence of the form “the being of x is grounded in
the being of yy” is to be treated as shorthand for something along the lines of “the fact that
x has being is grounded in the fact that yy have being.” Moreover, it is natural to use the
term “has being” interchangeably with “exists.” Yet, Bohn (2018, p. 4108, n. 4) implies that
he doesn’t intend “being” to mean the same thing as “existence.” What then is a sentence
of the form “the being of x is grounded in the being of yy” (translated into English from
“[Byy] < [Bx ]”) supposed to mean? It’s not obvious. Here’s a suggestion: replace sentences
of the form “the being of x is grounded in the being of yy” with a sentence along the lines of
“for any way that x is, x ’s being that way is grounded in yy’s being some way.” Quantifying
into predicate position: ∀F (Fx → ∃G([Gyy] < [Fx ])). For example, a philosopher might
claim that the being of a particular seizure (a) is grounded in the being of some neuron
firings (bb) in the sense that for every property that a has, there is some property that bb
collectively has such that the fact that a has the one property is grounded in the fact that
bb collectively has the other property. But on this interpretation, anyone who holds that
badness is a basic property of a that isn’t collectively had by bb will simply deny (on pain
of contradicting themselves) that the being of a is grounded in the being of bb. They will
insist that the grounding claim simply begs the question against their view. Unfortunately,
considering all the various ways that TDP might be interpreted is a task for another paper.
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market for a pan-ism should purchase that pan-ism together with Russellian
monism as a package deal. While panmoralists can accept Russellian monism
by maintaining that u-normative properties play microphysical roles, it is very
hard to see how pannormism can be successfully combined with Russellian
monism—even if normative properties are causally efficacious. For according
to the pannormist, the basic o-moral or o-normative properties are collectively
had by pluralities of ultimates but not by any individual ultimates. So, it is
hard to see how those properties could account for the microphysical properties
of those individual ultimates. Take an individual electron, for example. That
electron might belong to bad pluralities at some times but not at others. Yet,
there will never be a time at which it isn’t negatively charged. Therefore, if the
charge role is realized by some quiddity, that quiddity can’t be the badness of
any ordinary plurality of ultimates. The same reasoning should apply to most
(if not all) other microphysical roles.
If the basic plural collective o-moral or o-normative properties do not play
any microphysical roles, then at best they help account for certain o-moral
and o-normative facts but pretty much nothing else—they are one step re-
moved from being metaphysical “idlers.” The pannormist might respond that
the basic plural collective o-moral or o-normative properties still do important
metaphysical work and that is enough to earn their theoretical keep. Of course,
there is something similar to be said in defense of the fundamental laws of cer-
tain versions of robust realism and dualism. Even so, because the objection
that I am raising is comparative in nature, this response is beside the point.
Part of what makes Russellian monism so attractive is that it appears to offer
a relatively economical picture of the world. According to Russellian monists,
Mother Nature works her wonders from a small inventory of stock ingredients.
These include the basic kinds under which the ultimates fall as well as the
properties that their instances instantiate and the fundamental physical laws
that govern the behavior of those instances. In principle, everything else can be
explained in terms of the instances of these fundamental kinds and properties
in accordance with the fundamental laws of physics. By contrast, pannormism
is committed to saying that the basic properties of a plurality cannot “be
derived from basic properties of, and relations among, each members of the
plurality” (Bohn, 2018, p. 4120). As a result, the pannormist is forced to bloat
Mother Nature’s inventory by positing additional basic properties (e.g., bad-
ness).39 This isn’t a decisive reason to reject the view, but it does suggest that,
as with robust realism in metaethics and dualism in the philosophy of mind,
pannormism has theoretical costs that we should be reluctant to pay.
39 O’Conaill (2021) argues that this makes collective pluralized panpsychism vulnerable to
the charge of objectionable bruteness: “Both the emergentist and the pluralized panpsychist
hold that consciousness is a basic property that can only be instantiated when basic objects
are arranged in specific ways. The main difference between them, by Bohn’s lights, is that
he regards consciousness as a PCP [plural collective property] of pluralities of basic objects,
not (only) as a property of non-basic objects. But it is not clear why this should make the
difference between objectionable and non-objectionable bruteness” (p. 3). The same can be
said of pannormism.
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Next, as Bohn (2018) himself points out, pannormism seems to imply that
it is “metaphysically possible that all pluralities of basic objects simply fail
to instantiate the metaphysically basic plural collective normative properties,
on pain of inexplicable metaphysically necessary connections between some
pluralities of basic objects and some basic normative properties” (p. 4121).
In order to preserve the natural/moral global supervenience thesis, then, the
pannormist has to hold that there are necessary connections between the basic
o-moral or o-normative properties and the pluralities of ultimates that instan-
tiate them. As Bohn (2018, p. 4121) observes, robust realism faces a similar
problem. However, the robust realist may take the modal connections between
moral and natural properties to be explained by fundamental moral or norma-
tive laws. Since the alternative is to countenance a vast disarray of inexplicable
modal coincidences, there is pressure on the pannormist to posit fundamental
moral or normative laws as well. This introduces several new worries.
First, these moral or normative laws will add to an already bloated inven-
tory of basic kinds, properties, and laws, raising the theoretical costs of the
view. Second, there are reasons to doubt that the antecedents of these laws can
be specified in wholly microphysical terms. Perhaps it is a normative law that
if a plurality is arranged badness-wise, then it collectively has badness. Unlike
the plural collective property of being arranged molecule-wise, say, it is very
hard to see how the property of being arranged badness-wise is to be defined
or explained in terms of the microphysical properties of individual ultimates
or the spatial relations holding between them. This suggests that, in order to
posit fundamental moral or normative laws, the pannormist may be forced
to posit additional basic kinds as well (e.g., the plural collective property of
being arranged badness-wise). Consequently, even if the pannormist avoids
brute emergence, it may come at an increased cost of mystery and complexity
at the fundamental level. Finally, if these fundamental moral or normative
laws are taken to be normatively necessary but metaphysically contingent, as
Bohn (2018, p. 4121) favors, then pannormism still raises the epistemological
and explanatory worries that I raised for panmoralism in Section 5 above.
Finally, pannormism faces a dilemma similar to the one that I posed for
panmoralism. Consider the bad epileptic seizure from before, and suppose that
its being is fully grounded in the being of some ultimates. Assuming that bad-
ness is a basic property, pannormism entails that both the seizure and those
ultimates instantiate badness. In order to avoid the conclusion that badness
is emergent, therefore, the pannormist has to hold that the instantiation of
badness by the seizure is fully grounded in the instantiation of badness by
the ultimates from which that seizure is composed (Bohn, 2019, p. 390). Now,
either that ground-theoretic connection is explainable with reference to the
essences of things, or it isn’t. If it is, then it is hard to see how that connection
could be explained by the essence of anything other than badness (Rosen, 2010,
p. 133). But as Fine (2012) might put it, even if the essence of badness knows
something of other normative properties and relations, it certainly doesn’t
know anything of the ultimates and the composition relations into which they
enter. It is no part of what it is to be bad that badness at one level of reality
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gives rise to badness at some other level of reality (whether higher up or lower
down reality’s compositional chains). If that ground-theoretic connection isn’t
explainable with reference to the essences of things, then as with non-reductive
panmoralism, pannormism appears to be committed to something very close
to the brute emergence it is meant to avoid: while the robust realist posits
brute normative or moral laws connecting o-moral properties to natural prop-
erties, the pannormist posits brute grounding connections between o-moral
or o-normative properties at different levels of reality. Again, this leads us to
complexity, discontinuity, and mystery.40
7 Lessons
So what does all this matter for panpsychism? Again, we arrive at these
metaethical views as a result of more or less the same considerations by which
we arrive at panpsychism. Moreover, it is unclear how we can break the rel-
evant parallels in metaethics and the philosophy of mind. What to do? Since
panmoralism and pannormism are counterintuitive, problematic, and prob-
lematic for reasons similar to those for which naturalism and robust realism
are problematic, I believe that the answer is to reject the master argument
for panpsychism. And without some other argument to support the view, that
means giving up panpsychism as well.
As I mentioned at the outset, the moral parody argument confronts panpsy-
chists with four options: (i) adopt panmoralism; (ii) reject moral realism; (iii)
explain how the relevant parallels can be broken; or (iv) replace the argument
for panpsychism with some other argument that doesn’t overgeneralize to sup-
port panmoralism. I have already provided reasons to be skeptical of option (i),
and it remains to be seen whether option (iii) can be successfully defended in
future work. Option (iv) is a promising direction for panpsychists—although,
as I explained in Section 5, there is a case to be made that the causal argument
for panpsychism also overgeneralizes to support panmoralism. Of course, the
panpsychist might simply adopt option (ii). But without an independent and
compelling argument against moral realism, option (ii) adds to the costs that
panpsychism already incurs. More importantly, it suggests that the master
argument for panpsychism is not a very good one after all. For even if some
panpsychists are inclined to reject moral realism, it is hard to take seriously an
40 The second horn of this dilemma raises the same general worries that I considered in
Section 5 after laying out a similar dilemma for panmoralism. My replies are the same,
but I leave it to the reader to fill in the details. In the present context, I have one more
point to make. Suppose that the pannormist attempts to evade the dilemma by holding
that grounding connections do not need essence-based explanations. This may come at an
additional dialectical cost. Bohn (2018) motivates a ban on emergence by arguing that “it
is a good methodological rule to not postulate emergence beyond necessity” (p. 4111). He
then suggests that this methodological rule is a good one because it is “intended to rule
out unnecessary and unexplained things” (p. 4111). As a result, there is some pressure on
the pannormist to explain why it is a good methodological rule not to postulate emergence
beyond necessity but a bad methodological rule not to postulate brute grounding connections
beyond necessity, given that both rules are intended to minimize unexplained facts.
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argument for panpsychism that compels moral realists to accept panmoralism
on pain of rejecting moral realism altogether.
Supposing that’s right, then what exactly goes wrong with the master
argument for panpsychism? Some of the aforementioned problems for pan-
moralism suggest a potential diagnosis. What typically gets panpsychism going
against physicalism is an intuition of distinctness with respect to the experien-
tial and the microphysical (Papineau, 2002, ch. 6). In order to avoid (something
close to) brute emergence, there is pressure on panpsychists to posit essential
connections between o-phenomenal and u-phenomenal properties. This makes
panpsychism once again susceptible to the very anti-reductionist intuitions
that play an important role in the usual arguments against physicalism.41
Now, while I have focused on parallels in metaethics and the philosophy of
mind, there is a more general lesson to be learned here. The moral parody argu-
ment for panmoralism is just one instance of an argument schema concerning
any two phenomena that together seem to give rise to a distinctive explana-
tory gap.42 We can produce additional instances of this schema in support of
panrepresentationism, panmeaning ism,43 panbeauty ism, pangastronomicism,44
and so on. If the panpsychist can’t break the relevant parallels, then the in-
credulous stares will just keep multiplying. And while an incredulous stare is
not an argument, there are only so many incredulous stares that a philosopher
can take before wondering whether something has gone wrong.
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